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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE A. A. A.
PROCESSING TAX
THOS. F. GREN, JR.*
To be able consciously to observe history in the making is always
interesting. Frequently we do not realize the importance of events
which we witness. Some events however are so obviously destined to
influence substantially the current of national or international life that
their rsults cast shadows before them. Such an event is the coming
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the constitution-
ality of the processing tax imposed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
A writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the First Circuit Court
of Appeals in Butler, et al., Receivers of the Hoosac Mills Corporation
v. United States' holding the tax unconstitutional, has been granted.2
Whatever disposal is to be made of this case is sure to affect the
economic history of this country. 3 Our legal history will be materially
affected if the Supreme Court discusses the taxing power under the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause. This is true because the meaning of that clause
has never been decided by the Supreme Court.4 It is a part of the first
paragraph of Article 1, Section 8 which is as follows:
"The Congress shall have power-
"To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the
debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."5
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
'78 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935) (reversing 8 F. Supp. 552 (D. Mass. 1934)).
-3 U. S. L. Week 73, October 15, 1935. The argument has been set for
December 9.
See Jennings and Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agriculture (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 878.
'The question was presented in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43
Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. ed. 1078 (1923), and was argued by counsel for both sides but
the Court decided the case on another issue. The question was also reserved in
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294 (1892), and Smith v.
Kansas City Title Co., 255 U. S. 180, 190, 192, 41 Sup. Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577, 579,
580 (1921).
'This is the way these provisions are written in modern times and the way
they are quoted in opinions of the Supreme Court. TnE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION (1819) gives the Constitution, supposedly as adopted, in a supplement
beginning on page'489. In this supplement, Section 8 of Article 1 appears on page
494, with a colon after "excises" and with the rest of the provisions quoted above
forming a separate paragraph. On page 356 appears an earlier copy called the
Revised Draft with the same _paragraphing but a semicolon in place of the colon.
The report of the dommittee which added the words, to pay the debts etc,, after
the words, taxes, duties, imposts and excises shows all in one paragraph with
neither a colon nor semicolon between, but only a comma. Page 323. A copy
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If this one paragraph should be construed as conferring several dif-
ferent powers-the taxing power being one and the power to provide for
the -general welfare another-the government would be clothed with
published in Elliott's Debates (J. B. Lippincott ed. 1896) is said to be copied from
and carefully compared with the original in the Department of State. "Punctua-
tion, paragraphs, and capital letters, same as said original." This copy as reproduced
in Richardson, Journal of the Federal Convention Analyzed (1899) 234, 237, shows
only a comma and no new paragraph or capital "T" in "to pay." See comment in
note 8 to article by Corwin, 36 HA~v. L. Rgv. 551 (1923).
The history of the Constitution and the language of the document considered
as a whole indicate that Congress was not intended to have the power to do any-
thing and everything that would promote the general welfare. Otherwise why
enumerate all the other powers? Enumeration would be unnecessary if Congress
were authorized in the beginning to do everything that would provide for the gen-
eral welfare. FEDERALIST XLI; 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNIrm STATES (3d ed. 1858) §§907, 908; 4 JEFFRmSON'S CORRESPONDENCE
524, 525, cited in STORY, op. cit. smpra, §926; POMEROY, AN INTRODUcTiON TO THE
CONSTiTUTioNAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1879) 174; WMLOUGHBY,
PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (2nd' ed. 1930)
§58; United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425 (W. D. Mo. 1898). See also the re-
marks of Governor Randolph and Mr. George Nicholas in the Virginia Conven-
tion, 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES (1828) 170, 195; of a Mr. Wilson in Pennsylvania, 3
ELLIoT, DEBATES (1828) 262.
In United States v. Boyer, District Judge Rogers says of Judge Story, at page
432 of 85 Fed.:
"After a most elaborate and historical discussion of the subject, -presenting the
different views of the different political schools or parties, he concludes that the
'general welfare' clause 'contains no grant of power whatsoever, but it is a mere
expression of the ends and purposes to be effected by the preceding power of tax-
ation.' Id. §911. I content myself with the fact that the former construction has
never been sustained by any court, and the reverse has been held so often as not
to require citations to support it; while the latter construction rests upon the
theory that the 'general welfare' clause contains no power of itself to enact any
legislation, but, on the contrary, the words 'and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States,' according to the most liberal con-
structionist, is a limitation on the taxing power of the United States, and that
only."
Dr. Pomeroy in the passage cited above says: "... or does it [the Constitution]
confer a limited power of taxation, by restricting the purposes for which taxes
may be laid, and confining them to the payment of debts and provision for the
common defence and general welfare? The latter construction is the one which
has been ,almost universally adopted, although the language, taken apart from the
context, is susceptible of the other. There are two grounds for preferring the
interpretation which has been generally received. Both these clauses are found
in a subsection which relates to taxation, and it would be doing violence to the con-
text to wrest one of these from its natural connection and make it refer to a
subject entirely different. But again: if the construction should be adopted which
regards the second clause as an independent grant of power, it would, in effect,
be making our general government unlimited. Providing for the common defence
and general welfare includes every thing which any government could possibly do;
and a grant of power in these broad terms would be the same as making Congress
omnipotent, equal in the extent of its functions to the British Parliament.
"Section 274. The subsection should, therefore, be understood as though it
read, taxes may be laid and collected in order to pay debts and .provide for the
common defence and general welfare." Yet at the time when the adoption of the
Constitution was being debated there were those that took the other view. A
delegate said in the New York convention:
"I yesterday expressed my fears that this clause would tend to annihilate the
state governments. I also observed that the powers granted by it were indefinite
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much broader powers than the previous decisions of the Court have ever
suggested. That the Court will so construe the clause is most unlikely.
The result would be the abandonment of the doctrine that the Federal
Government is a government of enumerated powers.0 The decision
therefore may be expected to either hold or assume that the Welfare
Clause is a description of the taxing power. In other words Congress
may exercise the taxing power to pay the debts and to provide for the
common defense and general welfare.
The Government's petition for certiorari alleges1 that seven questions
are presented by the case (Butler or Hoosac Mills Case) :
"Whether the processing and floor stock taxes sought to be imposed
by the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, constitute an invalid
exercise of the power of Congress under the Constitution:
"(1) In that said taxes are direct taxes and therefore should be ap-
portioned under the provisions of Article I, Section 9, clause 4, of the
Constitution.
"(2) In that said taxes are not uniform and therefore violate the
provisions of Article I, Section 8, clause 1, of the Constitution.
"(3) In that said taxes amount to the taking of property without
due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution.
"(4) In that there has been improperly delegated to the executive
with respect to said taxes, legislative power granted to the Congress by
Article I, Section 8, clause 1, of the Constitution.
"(5) In that said taxes are not authorized by any authority vested
in Congress under the Constitution, and hence constitute an improper
exercise of the powers reserved to the States, in violation of the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
"(6) In that said taxes are not levied or the proceeds appropriated
for the general welfare, but rather for a private as distinguished from a
public purpose.
"(7) In that said taxes are to be expended for a purpose not author-
ized by any specific, composite or implied grant of constitutional power."
The more important questions are listed last and the seven problems
will therefore be discussed here in reverse order.
since the congress are authorized to provide for the common defence and general
welfare and to pass all laws necessary for the attainment of those important
objects." 1 ELLioT, DEBAxs (1828) 300. See also 2 id. 327, 328.
One of the most interesting discussions of this perplexing problem is that of
RicHADSONx, op. cit. supra. He advances the proposition that the language used
was the result of a compromise and was intentionally made equally subject to
either of 'two interpretations-the Federal or the National. The former inter-
pretation would be that the power is to tax for the general welfare and perhaps
that the general welfare is limited by the other enumerated powers, the latter in-
terpretation that there is a substantive power to provide for the general welfare.
' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819) ; Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U. S. 46, 89, 90, 27 Sup. Ct. 655, 664, 51 L. ed. 956, 971 (1906).
'73 U. S. L. Week 2, Sept. 3, 1935.
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I
Is the tax invalid because the proceeds are to be expended 8 for a
purpose not authorized by the Constitution?8' The Constitution nowhere
specifically authorizes appropriations by Congress. The power to ap-
propriate certainly exists, however, and it has been held 9 that tax money
I The pertinent provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act are as follows:
"Sec. 1. Declaration of emergency
"The present acute economic emergency being in part the consequence of a
severe and increasing disparity between the prices of agricultural and other corn-
modities, which disparity has largely destroyed the purchasing power of farmers
for industrial products, has broken down the orderly exchange of commodities,
and has seriously impaired the agricultural assets supporting the national credit
structure, it is hereby declared that these conditions in the basic industry of agri-
culture have affected transactions in agricultural commodities with a national pub-
lic interest, have burdened and obstructed the normal currents of commerce in
such commodities, and render imperative the immediate enactment of title I of
this Act."
"Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the -policy of Congress-
"(1) To establish and maintain such balance between the production and con-
sumption of agricultural commodities, and such marketing conditions therefor, as
will re~stablish prices to farmers at a level that will give agricultural commodities
a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the
purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period. The base period
in the case of all agricultural commodities except tobacco shall be the prewar
period, August 1909-July 1914. In the case of tobacco, the base period shall be
the postwar period, August 1919-July 1929...
"Sec. 8. In order to effectuate the declared policy, the Secretary of Agriculture
shall have power-
"(1) To provide for reduction in the acreage or reduction in the production for
-market, or both, of any basic agricultural commodity, through agreements with
producers or by other voluntary methods, and to provide for rental or benefit pay-
ments in connection therewith or upon that part of the production of any basic
agricultural commodity required for domestic consumption, in such amounts as
the secretary deems fair and reasonable, to be -paid out of any moneys available
for such payments. .. "
Section 9 levies processing taxes to be in effect when the Secretary of Agri-
culture determines that rental or benefit payments are to be made. The tax is to be
paid by the processor on the first domestic processing at such rate as equals the
difference between the current average farm price for the commodity and the fair
exchange value of the commodity. The fair exchange value shall be the price
that will give the commodity the same purchasing -power as such commodity had
during the base period specified in Section 2.
"Sec. 12 (b). In addition to the foregoing, [appropriation from any money
in the treasury] the proceeds derived from all taxes imposed under this title are
hereby appropriated to be available to the Secretary of Agriculture for expansion
of markets and removal of surplus agricultural products and the following pur-
poses under part 2 of this title: Administrative expenses, rental and benefit pay-
ments and refunds on taxes. ... " 48 STAT. 31 (1933) 7 U. S. C. A. §601 et seq.
(1934 Supp.).
1 The Government argues in its brief in the Supreme Court that as a matter of
public -policy respondents should not be permitted to question the appropriation as
a defence to their taxes; and also that the appropriation is constitutional. Page
123.
' "Having power to raise money for that purpose [to pay the debts] it of course
follows that it has power when the money is raised to appropriate it to the same
object." United States v. Realty Company, 163 U. S. 427, 440, 16 Sup. Ct. 1120,
1125, 41 L. ed. 215,219 (1896).
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can be expended for the purposes mentioned in the first clause 10 of
Section 8, Article 1 which confers the taxing power. First, taxes may
be levied to pay the debts of the United States. Debts include moral
obligations." The Agricultural Adjustment Act led farmers to believe
that they would be paid rentals or benefits and they acted in reliance
thereon. They were put in a position where they had to plan their
planting with a view to the A. A. A. Those that elected to co6perate
will be saved harmless from the reduction of their crops only if they are
compensated by the Government. However, if these facts constitute a
debt of the United States, Congress must have indicated an intention to
pay the debt in order for the tax to be valid on this ground. The lan-
guage of the Act 12 indicates an intention to pay rentals and benefits for
the purpose of raising the purchasing power of agricultural commodities,
not for the purpose of discharging a debt.
Passing on to the words, "and provide for the common defense and
general welfare,"'18 the "common defense" obviously is not provided for
by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. That brings us to the General
Welfare Clause and the sixth question stated in the Government's
petition.
II
Is the tax invalid because not levied for the general welfare but
rather for a private as distinguished from a public purpose? The lan-
guage used by the attorneys for the Government indicates an assumption
of a connection between general welfare and public purpose. The as-
sumption seems well founded. Doesn't "general welfare" put upon the
taxing power the same limitations that result from the doctrine of "pub-
lic purpose"? The Supreme Court has never decided 14 that the Congress
can impose taxes only for public purposes but the language used in
"The Realty Company opinion, cited note 9, supra, assumes that Section 8 of
Article 1 is as follows: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to .pay the debts and provide for the common defence
and general welfare of the United States etc. See siupra note 5. The present dis-
cussion will be based on this assumption.
I United States v. Realty Company, 163 U. S. 427, 16 Sup. Ct. 1120, 41 L. ed.
215 (1896).
See note 8, supra.
Still assuming that these words are a part of the first paragraph of Section 8
of Article 1 and are a part of the statement of the taxing power and not a state-
ment of a separate power. Due to overlapping of questions 5, 6 and 7 of the Gov-
ernment petition the problem of whether the General Welfare Clause authorizes
the appropriations is discussed in divisions II and III in connection with questions
6 and 5 of the petition.
2But in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 450, 26 Sup. Ct. 110,
112, 50 L. ed. 261, 265 (1905), appears the dictium that the grant is limited in two
ways in Section 8. The revenue must be collected for public purposes and all
duties, etc. must be uniform throughout the United States.
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Citize Savings & Loan Association v. Topeka15 is broad enough to
apply to the United States as well as to the individual states. Conse-
quently it may safely be said that Congress can impose taxes only for
public purposes either because of the inherent nature of the taxing power
or because of the General Welfare Clause. Public welfare would ap-
parently have the same meaning as general welfare. 16
Some half century ago Professor Cooley said, "There is no such
thing as drawing a clear and definite line of distinction between purposes
of a public and those of a private nature. Public and private interests
are so commingled in many'cases that it is difficult to determine which
predominates; ... all attempts to lay down general rules whereby the
difficulty may be solved have seemed, when new and peculiar cases arose,
only to add to the embarrassment instead of furnishing the means of
extrication from it.' 7 Many cases have been decided since but the
concept of public purpose remains vague.
In Citizens' Savings & Loan Association v. Topeka'8 the Supreme
Court of the United States said that in deciding whether in a given case
the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon the one side or the
other of the line dividing private interest from public use, the courts
must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government,
the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long course of
legislation levied. But in Green v. Frazier'9 the same Court said that
under the peculiar conditions existing in North Dakota that State could
appropriate money to establish a state-owned system of warehouses,
elevators, flour mills, factories, plants and equipment for the purpose of
improving the marketing conditions for farm products and thereby re-
alizing for the farmers just prices (that is, prices deemed by the legis-
lature to be just). The "peculiar situation" referred to by the Court
seems to consist mainly of the importance of agriculture to the State,
the dependency of other industries on agriculture, and the impossibility
or difficulty of improving the condition of agriculture without state aid.
The same situation existed in the United States as a whole when the
Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed. In the opinion in Green v.
' 87 U. S. 655, 22 L. ed. 455 (1875). "The theory of our governments, state
and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.... We have
established we think beyond cavil that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid
for a public purpose." 87 U. S. at 664, 22 L. ed. at 461.
"Cf. Kansas Gas & Electric Company v. City of Independence, 79 Fed. (2d)
32 (C. C. A. 10th, Aug. 20, 1935), where it is said that the general welfare within
the meaning of the Constitution is the national or general welfare; the limitation
merely precludes the use of the Federal tax power for local or special purposes.
The case holds PWA grants and loans valid.
I COOLEY, LAW OF TAXATION (2nd ed. 1886) 106.
"Supra note 15.
"253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499, 64 L. ed. 878 (1920).
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Frazier, the Court recognized that North Dakota was entering into activ-
ities which in the past had been considered as entirely within the domain
of private enterprise. The view expressed in Loan Association v.
Topeka, as to the controlling effect of customary practices of govern-
ment was therefore disregarded.
The significance of Green v. Frazier in connection with the question
of the public or private nature of the purpose behind the processing tax
is emphasized by the fact that in each case the legislative body is en-
deavoring to raise prices by setting up a plan in which farmers are per-
mitted but not forced to participate and by this statement in the Green
opinion:
"This legislation was adopted under the broad power of the State to
enact laws raising by taxation such sums are are deemed necessary to
promote purposes essential to the general welfare of its people."2 0
The language used by the Court in describing the power of the State
of North Dakota might be a paraphrase of the language of the General
Welfare Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court held that
under that power North Dakota could appropriate money to be expended
for the purpose of raising prices of farm products. Why cannot the
United States do the same thing-the same power having been expressly
conferred upon it by the Constitution?
This broad view of the ultimate purpose of the two statutes is sound
and establishes the Green Case as a precedent on the question of the
public purpose of agricultural price fixing. A consideration which
may militate against the acceptance of this case as a precedent in the
A. A. A. case is the fact that in the scheme which the Supreme Court
upheld the money was appropriated to state owned enterprises, whereas
under the A. A. A. the money is paid directly to individual farmers. In
some cases state ownership has been made the determining factor.2 1
The only direct appropriations to private business which the decisions
have held valid are grants to railroads. Most courts hold that privately
owned railroads may be given or loaned public money and land.22 One
reason given is that long railroad lines cannot be financed without gov-
ernment aid.2 3 Thus necessity for government aid is an important fac-
tor. Another reason given is that railroads may be compared to ordinary
m Italics ours. Id. at 238, 40 Sup. Ct. at 501, 64 L. ed. at 881.
2See Vette v. Childers, 102 Okla. 140, 149, 228 Pac. 145, 149 (1924). The
Supreme Court's attitude is discussed in a note in (1928) 41 HAxv. L. REV. 775.
See particularly footnotes 6 and 8, page 776.
'Rogers v. Burlington, 70 U. S. 654, 18 L. ed. 79 (1865) ; Queensbury v. Culner,
86 U. S. 83, 22 L. ed. 100 (1873) ; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60, 26 L. ed. 1008
(1881) ; Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514 (1876). Contra: People v. Salem, 20 Mich.
452, 4 Am. R. 400 (1870).
Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514 (1876).
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roads and these have long been the object of government spending.24
However, as already indicated, the question whether governments have
customarily spent their funds for the purpose under consideration is be-
coming less important in the determination of the character of that
purpose.
The railroad cases show that money is in some circumstances spent
for a public purpose although granted to private persons. In the other
decided cases the necessary circumstances simply were not present. The
circumstances which justify a tax and appropriation to private persons
are such as result in benefit to the public of sufficient importance to
justify the expenditure. The mere fact that some individuals benefit
more than the average member of the general public does not make the.
statute invalid. The establishment and maintenance of roads, schools,
fire departments, canals, postal facilities, etc., mean more to some per-
sons than to others. A stockholder of Sears, Roebuck & Company un-
doubtedly receives a benefit from the postal service many times greater
and much more direct than that which the average inhabitant receives.
The private benefit in such cases is sometimes said to be incidental. 25
However the private benefit may truly be said to be incidental in all
cases where the public benefit is sufficiently substantial. Where both
the public and private individuals profit, the pertinent question is simply
whether the public gain is important and substantial enough to justify
the expenditure of public money.26 There is no sense in weighing the
private gain also.27 In the past the courts have sustained the payment
of money from the public treasury to private individuals only in the
case of railroads because in no other cases presented for adjudication
did the public welfare require such payments. It is believed that no
"Rogers v. Burlington; Perry v. Keene, both supra note 22. See Chamber-
layne, The Sugar Bounties (1892) 5 HARv. L. REv. 320, 325.
15 HARv. L. REv. 320, 326, 340; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60, 64, 26 L. ed.
1008, 1009 (1881).
'Of course the language of many cases is inconsistent with this doctrine but
the decisions are not. The following language from railroad cases tends to sup-
port the argument advanced above:
"If the purpose is public it makes no difference that the agent by whose hand
it is to be attained is private.' Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514 (1876).
"It is unquestionably true that these enterprises may be, and probably always
are, undertaken with a view to private emolument on the part of the corporators;
but it is nevertheless true that the object of the government in creating them is
public utility, and that private benefit, instead of being the occasion of the grant,
is but the reward springing from the services." Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60,
26 L. ed. 1008 (1881).
1 Cf. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 43, 54, Sup. Ct. 599, 601, 78
L. ed. 1109, 1113 (1934) : "And a tax designed to be expended for a public pur-
pose does not cease to be one levied for that purpose because it has the effect of
imposing a burden upon one class of business enterprises in such a way as to
benefit another class."
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court has held an appropriation to 'be for a private purpose when the
money was to be distributed to a large group whose prosperity or lack
of prosperity has a major effect on the welfare of the public and when
the distribution was made for the purpose of establishing and stabilizing
that prosperity.
In the cases in which the Supreme Court has held the tax or ap-
propriation invalid the states have been seeking to aid a single manufac-
turing concern or a restricted class of manufacturers7" The money
spent on them would have only a slight effect on the welfare of the
public.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has made a good presentation of
the case for aid to agriculture in an opinion dealing with a county
appropriation for the salary of the county agricultural agent :28
"If it was essential to the establishment or existence of an enterprise
to be set up and sustained by public aid that all members of the public
or all members of any class should derive from it the same or like
benefits or advantages, then it would' be entirely impossible to describe
a public enterprise in aid of which public funds might be set apart.
There would not be any.
"The truth of this statement is so obvious that no elaboration is
needed. It is seen in the operation and conduct of all those uses that
are so distinctly public in their nature as to leave no room for doubt as
to their public character. There is no public road or public school or
public street or public park or public hospital from which some persons
do not derive more benefit than others.
"It is not, however, necessary that the whole body of the contrib-
uting public shall be directly the recipients of the benefits or advantages
accruing from the establishment of the object in aid of which public
funds may 'be set apart. It will be sufficient if it should be of such a
character as that it promotes the general welfare and prosperity of the
people who are taxed, to sustain it.
"Measured by these standards we have no doubt that public funds
may be set apart to develop and promote the general agricultural inter-
ests of the state, because it is a matter of common knowledge of which
everybody must take notice that in the agricultural interests of the state
lie its chief source of wealth, and that the prosperity of the state spring-
ing from this source contributes to the growth and importance of every
other industry in the state as well as to the comfort and happiness of
the whole people. And it is in recognition of this indisputable and
thoroughly known fact that appropriations made to stimulate the agri-
cultural interests of the state have always been regarded as made for a
public purpose."
21 Citizens' Savings & Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 655, 22 L. ed. 455 (1875);
Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487, 18 Sup. Ct. 442, 27 L. ed. 238 (1883) ; Cole
v. Lagrange, 113 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 416, 28 L. ed. 896 (1885).
2' Carman v. Hickman County, 185 Ky. 630, 216 S. W. 408 (1919).
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act declares that an economic emer-
gency exists 29 and surely no fairminded person would deny that such
an emergency did exist at the time the Act was passed.3 0 It is probable
that at least so far as agriculture is concerned the emergency has not
ceased.31 Does this have any effect on the nature of the purpose for
which the tax is imposed? The Supreme Court has said with regard
to legislative power to fix rents by regulation:
"Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space
as to clothe with such an interest wbat at other times or in other places
would be a matter of purely private concern. '3 2
The same Court in an opinion upholding a law which fixed the hours
of labor and a temporary wage scale between railroad employer and
employee, said:
"The proposition begs the question, since although an emergency
may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emer-
gency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already
enjoyed."3 3
This doctrine probably does not justify the tax as a regulatory meas-
ure under the Commerce Clause because that Clause even in an emer-
gency can not give power to regulate production which is neither inter-
state nor foreign commerce. 34 On the other hand the imposition of the
Supra note 8.See Jennings and Sullivan, loc. cit. supra note 3.
1 Three of the factors creating the emergency are the change of the United
State from a debtor to a creditor nation, the expansion of European agriculture
under government subsidies, and the reduction of the stock feed market in the
automobile age. The improvement of general business conditions will not relieve
these and other conditions peculiar to agriculture. As to the first two conditions,
Cf. WALLACE, NENv FRONTIERS (1934) 40, 88. See also id. c. 15.
' Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921).
'Wilson v. New, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. ed. 877 (1921). See
also Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 78 L. ed.
413 (1934) ; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. ed. 595
(1922); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. ed. 841
(1924); and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.
ed. 785 (1923), where it is said: "A limit in time to tide over a passing trouble
may well justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change." The
A. A. Act does not show a clear intention for its operation to continue only during
the emergency. It does provide that its purpose is to re~stablish prices to farmers
at a described level (see note 8, supra) and apparently contemplates that the Sec-
retary of Agriculture will cease to exercise his powers under the Act when this
level is reached. The question is, does this bring the case within the doctrine of
Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921), cited supra
note 32.
' "Over interstate transportation or its incidents, the regulatory power of Con-
gress is ample, but the production of articles intended for interstate commerce, is
a matter of local regulation." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 272, 38 Sup.
Ct. 529, 531, 62 L. ed. 1101, 1106 (1918). "Extraordinary conditions do not create
or enlarge constitutional power." Schechter v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 842,
79 L. ed. 888, 894 (U. S. 1935).
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tax as a measure to raise revenue to carry out the A. A. A. program
may be sustained because the power to tax to raise money for public
purposes has always existed and the emergency makes its exercise public.
III
The fifth question stated in the petition for certiorari in the Butler
Case is: Does the processing tax constitute an improper exercise of the
powers reserved to the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution? The powers reserved to the states are all those not
delegated to the Federal Government.
One of the powers conferred by Article 1, Section 8 on Congress is
the power to regulate commerce among the several states. Certain lan-
guage3 5 in the A. A. A. indicates that Congress was relying at least
partially on this power in passing the Act. The Supreme Court recently
has held3 6 that Congress can only regulate the "flow" or "current" of
interstate commerce and such matters as directly affect the "flow" or
"current." The regulation of transactions involving articles at rest is
not justified by the fact that these transactions indirectly affect com-
merce among the states. The same case decides that production cannot
be controlled with a view to raising prices81
Furthermore, regulation is not validated by being called a tax. In
the well-known Child Labor Tax Case38 it was held that an act of Con-
gress which clearly, on its face, is designed to penalize, and thereby to
discourage or suppress, conduct the regulation of which is reserved by
the Constitution exclusively to the states, cannot be sustained under the
Federal taxing power simply because the penalty is called a tax. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in its opinion in the Butler
Case assumes that the processing tax provisions are regulatory rather
than revenue raising. Judge Wilson speaking for the Court says:
"The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce does not
authorize it to do so by taxing products either of agriculture or industry
before they enter interstate commerce or otherwise to control their
production merely because their production may indirectly affect inter-
state commerce....
"The issue is not as the government contends, whether Congress can
appropriate funds raised by -general taxation for any purpose deemed
by Congress in furtherance of the 'general welfare' but whether Con-
"... . these conditions in the basic industry of agriculture.. . have burdened
and obstructed the normal currents of commerce ... " Title 1, §1, headed:
"Declaration of emergency." See note 8, supra.
'Schechter v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 888 (U. S. 1935).
*7 Id. at 851, 79 L. ed. at 905.
$Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817(1922). Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42, Sup. Ct. 453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922) held
unconstitutional a tax on contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery.
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gress has any power to control or regulate matters left to the states and
lay a special tax for that purpose."8 9
With all due respect to the learned Court, it must be said that this
proposition is unsound. Whether a tax is a regulatory measure or a
revenue-raising measure depends upon the intention of the legislature
as to the effect upon the taxpayer. An intention to regulate his actions
by penalizing those not desired is a regulatory law.40 A primary inten-
tion to make the taxpayer contribute to the support of some government
activity or activities creates a revenue-raising measure. In the Federal
Courts the intention, it seems, will invalidate the act only if it dearly
appears on the face of the act.41  If the provisions of the tax statute
show a primary42 intention on the part of Congress to regulate the tax-
payer then the statute is not an exercise of the taxing power and the
question becomes one of Congress' power to make regulations in that
particular field. Certainly the Agricultural Adjustment Act discloses no
purpose to regulate the taxpayers (manufacturers or processors). So
far as the tax and the taxpayer are concerned the statute is a revenue-
raising measure. If anyone is regulated it is the producer, the farmer.
But the tax is not levied on the farmer.4 3 Therefore the processing tax
78 F. (2d) at 7.
"Grant the validity of this law, and all that Congress -would need to do,
hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the great number of
subjects of public interest jurisdiction of which the States have never parted with
and which are reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, would 'be to enact a
detailed measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a so-
called tax upon departures from it.... So here the so-called tax is a penalty to
coerce people of a state to act as Congress wishes them to act... :' Child Labor
Tax Case, note 38, supra.
IIn McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78
(1904), the Court said of the tax on oleomargarine: "It being thus demonstrated
that the motive or purpose of Congress in adopting the acts in question may not be
inquired into, we are brought to consider the contentions relied upon to show that
the acts assailed were beyond the power of Congress, putting entirely out of view
all considerations based upon purpose or motive."
See also Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869). Of these
cases Chief Justice Taft in the Child Labor Tax Case, note 38 supra, said: "In
neither of these cases did the law objected to show on its face as does the law
before us the detailed specifications of a regulation of a state concern and business
with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such regulation." 259 U. S. at
42, 42 Sup. Ct. at 452, 66 L. ed. at 821. Cf. A. Magnano Company v. Hamilton,
292 U. S. 40, 44, 54 Sup. Ct. 599, 601, 78 L. ed. 1109, 1114 (1934).
"Incidental regulation of a matter reasonably related to enforcement of the tax
but otherwise beyond the power of Congress was upheld in United States v.
Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214, 63 L. ed. 493 (1919), a case dealing with
a special tax on the manufacture, importation and sale or gift of opium or coca
leaves or their compounds or derivatives.
IOne of the purposes for which the processing tax money is appropriated is
the payment of rentals and benefits for the reduction of acreage. The part the
United States takes in the plan is to furnish the scheme of operation and the
money, and to organize the growers. No governmental commands are issued to the
growers. They are not ordered to reduce acreage. They are invited to do so and
compensated if they accept. There is no regulation in the usual sense of the word.
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is obviously not an instrument of regulation.44 It is not used to coerce.
The Child Labor Tax Case45 dealing with a tax clearly appearing on its
face to be a penalty is not applicable.
The Hammer46 and Schechter47 Cases which deal with the power of
Congress over commerce are not in point. The Act under consideration
is an exercise of the power to tax. It is true that most Federal taxing
acts do not allocate the proceeds to particular use as this one does, but
such an allocation does not change the nature of the provision imposing
the tax nor prevent it from being a revenue-raising measure.
Does the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises
to provide for the general welfare authorize the processing tax? We
have already seen that a strong argument can be advanced to support
the proposition that this tax is imposed for a public purpose.48 There-
fore if Congress can lay taxes for any public purpose within the general
welfare of the United States the processing tax is probably valid. From
the time of the drafting of the Constitution to the present the extent of
the power conferred by the first paragraph of Section 8, Article 1 has
been debated. Three views have been advanced. One is that the taxing
power is conferred without limitation and the General Welfare Clause
is a separate grant of power. As already pointed out this view is not
tenable.49 A second view is that the expression "provide for the com-
mon defense and general welfare" is limited by the grants of power that
follow it. According to this theory Congress can appropriate for the
common defense and general welfare only by providing money to be
used in regulating interstate and foreign commerce, in establishing an
uniform rule of naturalization or bankruptcy, in coining money, estab-
lishing post offices, etc. The third view is the exact opposite of the sec-
ond. It considers that the taxing power is defined by the first paragraph
of Section 8 and is not restricted by the enumeration of other powers.
The third view is the strongest on both principle and authority5 0 but
However, even if the Supreme Court should~consider that the provisions of the Act
really amount to regulation of production or prices, the regulation would be ac-
complished by spending not by taxing. The Bailey Case therefore does not apply
and it would seem that the spending power authorizes spending for any national
public purpose.
"Jennings and Sullivan, supra note 3, at 905.
' Supra note 38.
'Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918),
a decision that Congress has no power to prohibit the transportation in interstate
commerce of goods manufactured in a factory employing child labor.
' Supra note 36.
The text preceding and following note 20, supra.
' Supra note 5.
' A thorough and convincing treatment of the question appears in Corwin,
Spending Power of Congress (1923) 36 HARv. L. Rxv. 548. See also Kansas Gas
& Electric Co. v. Independence, 79 Fed. (2d) 32, 37 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935);
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the second is at least arguable. In the first draft of the Constitution the
provision respecting taxation was: "The legislature of the United States
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and ex-
cises," 51 without any qualification. Later the words, "to pay the debts,
and provide for the common defense, and general welfare of the United
States" were added.52 From this circumstance and from the fact that
the first mention of common defense and general welfare in the Con-
stitution was made in connection with debts, some significance is at-
tempted to be drawn. Both Story53 and Madison 54 refer to this but they
reach opposite conclusions as to the meaning of the General Welfare
Clause. Story adopts our third view, Madison the second. The truth
is that none of the proceedings of the Convention referred to by these
writers throws any light on the problem. The desirability of providing
for the revolutionary debts may explain why the words were added but
does not explain what they mean. The use of the words, "general wel-
fare and common defense," in an early resolution 55 of the Convention
gives no information because they were there used to fix the type of
debts that were to be paid, whereas no such use of them is made in the
Constitution-in Section 8 of Article 1 they are separated from the
word, "debts," by the conjunction, "and."
Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries goes into the relation between
the taxing power and the other powers at considerable length. Section
977 of the Commentaries5" is as follows:
"The argument in favor of the power [to make appropriations not
within the scope of the other enumerated powers] is derived, in the first
place from the language of the clause, conferring the power, (which it
is admitted in its literal terms covers it) ; secondly, from the nature of
the power, which renders it in the highest degree expedient, if not in-
dispensable for the due operations of the national government; thirdly,
from the early constant and decided maintenance of it by the govern-
ment and its functionaries, as well as by many of our ablest statesmen,
from the very commencement of the constitution. So that it has the
language and intent of the text and the practice of the government to
sustain it against an artificial doctrine, set up on the other side."
The admission, referred to by Story, that the literal terms of Clause
1 cover the broader power, was made by James Madison in a letter to
McGuire, The New Deal and the Public Money (1935) 23 GEo. L. J. 155. Cf. The
Constitutionality of Government Spending for the General Welfare (1935) 22 VA.
L. REV. 1.
"JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1819) 220.
. Id. at 323, 326, 356, 494.
03 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5, §929.
r 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES (2nd ed. 1836) 612.
JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1891) 272.
1' Supra note 5.
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Speaker Stevenson. 57 Madison, however, argued for an interpretation
contrary to the literal meaning, insisting that Congress could tax and
appropriate only to carry out the other enumerated powers. s
Later writers have adopted Story's view.5 9 Only one contrary opin-
ion has been found among them.60 The opinion of many who par-
ticipated in the drafting and adoption of the Constitution also accorded
with that of Story. Some of the more prominent were George Wash-
ington,61 Alexander Hamilton,6 2 Andrew Jackson,6 3 James Monroe
0 4
and John Q. Adams. 5 Others of less prominence stated their agree-
ment with this interpretation during the debates in the State Conven-
tions.00 In several opinions the Supreme Court has referred to the
power of Congress to tax for the general welfare without suggesting
that the power is limited by the enumeration of other powers. 67
The executive and legislative branches of the Government have each
repeatedly given this same interpretation to the taxing clause. Story was
able to say in 1833 that with one exception every President of the United
States had adopted this view.0 8 The notable exception was James Mad-
ison. Congress has from the beginning of its existence to the present
acted in accordance with this view.0 9 Expressions 70 by statesmen of
r Supra note 54.
18 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES (1828) 280. Other statements -by Madison have been cited
as taking the same view (page 683 note 1, 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5) but they
may be interpreted as merely denying a substantive power to provide for the gen-
eral welfare. See for instance FEDERALIST, number 41.
- §59 of WLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 5; §§274 and 275 of POMEROY, op. cit.
supra note 5; COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CoNSTITuIONAL LAW (4th. ed.
1931) 61; CORWIN, 10c. cit. supra note 50.
® TucKxR, THE CONsTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1899) 478. Perhaps
Chamberlayne, The Sugar Bounties (1892) 5 HAiv. L. REv. 320 should be added.
His position is not clear Within itself and is based on a misinterpretation of Story's
views. The authors of TAXATiON UNDER THE A. A. A. (1934) seem not to have
fully analyzed the problem of interpretation involved and make a misleading ref-
erence to Hamilton's views. See page 43.
"Footnote 1 page 685 of 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5; Corwin, supra note 50,
at 555.
§978 of 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5; FEDERALIST, numbers 30, 34.
614 ELuior, DEBATES (2nd ed. 1836) 525, 526, 527.
Ibid. See also quotation in opinion 79 Fed. (2d) at 38.
1 Footnote 2 page 681 of 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5.
1 ELLIOT, DEBATES (1828) 81, 82, 311; 2 id. 170, 183, 195, 328, 344; 3 id. 262,
290.
, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 1, 199, 6 L. ed. 23, 71 (1824); Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 75 U. S. 533, 540, 19 L. ed. 482, 485 (1869) ; United States v. Realty Com-
pany, 163 U. S. 427, 16 Sup. Ct. 1120, 41 L. ed. 215 (1896). In Kansas Gas &
Electric Co. v. Independence, 3 U. S. L. Week 8 (C. C. A. 10th, Aug. 20, 1935), it
was expressly held by the Circuit Court of Appeals that Federal taxation may be
used for a purpose other than the exercise of the specifically enumerated powers
of the Federal Government.
" Footnote 1 page 694 of 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5.
S1 KENT, COMMENTARIES (1826) 250; Corwin, supra note 50, at 579; MAC-
DONALD, A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN SUBSIDY SYSTEM (1928).
" Note 63 supra.
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the period show clearly that early aid for internal improvements was
furnished by Congress in the belief that the general welfare clause
authorized such aid and that it was unnecessary to show that the im-
provements would affect either post roads or the raising of armies or
commerce. Andrew Jackson thought that the purchase of the Louisiana
Territory was an exercise of the power to spend for the general welfare
and was not within the scope of any of the other powers.7 ' Congress
has continued to spend on education, health and agriculture.72 Although
unusually comprehensive and requiring an unprecedented amount of
money the present program is not by any means the first aid to agricul-
ture by the Federal Government. The very maintenance of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture is an expenditure unconnected with any power ex-
cept that conferred by the General Welfare Clause.
At least two appropriations similar to the A. A. A. benefits have been
made by Congress in the past. The earliest was the provision for pay-
ment of bounties to the codfish industry during 1792 and the succeeding
half century ;78 the other, bounties to sugar-raisers to encourage the
production of raw sugar in this country.7 4 In both of these appropria-
tions it was provided that money was to be paid directly to individuals
for their private gain. The payments served the nation only by en-
couraging important industries. The industries were not as important
to the welfare of the public as agriculture is. Nor was business gen-
erally so much in need of aid in the periods when those bounties were
granted.
The proper conclusion therefore is that the power of Congress to
tax for the general welfare is not limited in any way by the enumeration
of other powers in the Constitution. As Chief Justice Chase said of the
words, "to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and gen-
eral welfare": "More comprehensive words could not have been used." 75
Taxes imposed to raise money to be used for reEstablishing the pur-
chasing power of agricultural commodities are, under the present con-
ditions of agriculture and business, imposed to provide for the general
4 ELLIOT, DEBATES (2nd ed. 1836) 525, 526. But in American Insurance Com-
pany v. Canter, 26 U. S. 511, 542, 7 L. ed. 242, 255 (1828) Chief Justice Marshal
said: "The constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union the
-powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently, that government
possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or treaty."
' "An exposition of the Constitution deliberately established by legislative acts,
on the faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be
lightly disregarded." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
1 STAT. 229 (1792) ; §991 of 1 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5.
'26 STAT. 583 (1890). See Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36
L. ed. 294 (1892), and Chamberlayne, The Sugar Bounties (1892) 5 HARV. L. REV.
320, in which the discussion of the General Welfare Clause is inadequate. See also
note 4 supra.
7 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869).
44 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
welfare. Therefore Congress, although probably without express power
to control production or prices, has implied power (resulting from
the taxing power) to control them by spending money.70 The Tenth
Amendment is not violated since no power which is delegated to the
National Government can at the same time be a power reserved to the
states.
An interesting sidelight on the probable decision as to the processing
tax's constitutionality is furnished by the argument of Charles Evans
Hughes (then an attorney at the bar, now Chief Justice) in Smith v.
Kansas City Title Company.77 He argued for an interpretation of the
taxing power that would leave the phrase, "general welfare," unfettered
by the subsequent enumeration of powers, saying:
"The federal appropriations in 1917 in support of agriculture
amounted to upwards of $29,000,000, and in 1918 to upwards of
$45,000,000.
"There can be no question as to the continuous practical construction
of the powers of Congress to raise and appropriate money to the effect
that this power is not limited to the objects enumerated in the subse-
quent provisions but extends what may properly be deemed to be em-
braced within the general welfare as expressly provided in the clause
which confers the taxing power itself."73
Of course the Chief Justice on the bench today may take a different
stand from that asserted by the advocate at the bar some fifteen years
ago. If he does not, that view presented to the Court then and neither
accepted nor rejected may become the view of the majority of the
Court. He is generally supposed to be the balance of power between the
so-called liberal and so-called conservative justices. It is therefore pos-
sible that his opinion will decide the outcome.
IV
The fourth question in the petition for certiorari deals with the
authority delegated to the executive. :Both proponents and opponents
Cf. this statement: "Hence it is that, though Congress has not a general legis-
lative power to provide that the Federal Government may do everything whether
by way of regulation or of direct control and operation, which may conceivably
secure the common defense and 'promote the general welfare of the United States,
it nevertheless has a general power to appropriate the public moneys of the United
States for these purposes." WiLLoumBY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 65.
In addition to the taxing and spending power the Government relies on the
comprehensive national authority over revenue, finance and currency. See brief
in Supreme Court in Hoosac Mills Case, page 241.
7255 U. S. 180, 41 Sup. Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577 (1921), cited note 4, supra.
The report of the case gives only an outline of the brief. The quotation
given here is reproduced from footnote 84, page 579 of Corwin, supra note 50.
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of the Act recognize that the power to legislate cannot be delegated by
Congress to any person or group of persons. On the other hand it is
evident that in certain types of legislation power to administer the statute
must be conferred on the President or executive departments. The
Supreme Court decisions recognize the obvious and assign to Congress
the function of "laying down policies and establishing standards, while
leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules
within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the
policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply." 79
The Agricultural Adjustment Act confers on the Secretary of Agri-
culture power to determine the existence of facts which initiate the tax,
fix its rate and bring it to an end.80 That his initiation of the tax must
be based upon a determination of facts which establish a need for the
tax in order to produce revenue to put into effect the policies of Con-
gress is shown by the following provisions: The tax goes into effect
when the Secretary determines that benefit and rental payments are to
be made.81 His power to provide for these payments is qualified by the
words "to effectuate the declared policy."8 2  The declared policy of
Congress is to re~stablish prices to farmers at a level fixed by standards
set forth in the Act.83 The exercise of the other powers8 4 conferred on
the Secretary by Section 8 are of course subject to the same qualifica-
tion if this interpretation is correct. The only other possible interpre-
tation of Section 8 is that for the purpose of effectuating the policy of
Congress, Congress gives the powers mentioned but the Secretary may
exercise the powers without reference to the definitely stated policy.
There is nothing to indicate that this absurd situation was intended.
The declared policy therefore furnishes a set of standards established by
Congress in accordance with which the executive is to provide sub-
ordinate rules and determine facts to which the policy can apply. This
is in accord with the requirements prescribed in the Schechter Case.85
In that case the delegation of power by the N. I. R. A. was held un-
constitutional. An examination of the declaration of policy 86 in that
Schechter v. United States, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 888 (U. S. 1935).§9 (a). . Ibid.
S§8(1). Note 8 supra. §2. Note 8 supra.Numerous matters are left by the Act to be dealt with by regulation of the
Secretary but many of them are so obviously administrative that they do not
warrant notice. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct.
236, 60 L. ed. 493 (1916). It does not seem that the number of administrative
details left within the executive's control should invalidate the delegation of power
-the intimation in TAXATION UNDER THE A. A. A. (at page 78, §§50 and 51),
supra note 55, to the contrary notwithstanding.
* 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 888 (U. S. 1935), cited note 79, supra.
"A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and disor-
ganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the
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statute will show, however, that the policy is not defined with the
definiteness used in the A. A. -A. By the N. I. R. A. the Pres-
ident was authorized to approve or adopt Codes of Fair Competition87
to effectuate the declared policy which included the increase of the "con-
sumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchas-
ing power."88 The Act did not state how the purchasing power should
be increased nor to what extent it should be increased.
The A. A. A. on the other hand defines a level to which purchasing
power is to be raised and provides that the means used shall be contracts
for curtailing production.8 9 Nor does the Agricultural Act use any
such undefined term as "fair competition" which the Court said in the
Schechter Case added nothing to the insufficient generalities given to
guide the executive. In Panama Refining Company v. RyanO another
attempt in the National Recovery Act to delegate power to the Pres-
ident was held invalid. But what that Act sought to do was to delegate
the power to prohibit transportation in interstate and foreign commerce
of petroleum and petroleum products produced or withdrawn from stor-
age in excess of the amount permitted by state law, without defining the
circumstances and conditions in which the transportation was to be al-
lowed or prohibited. In other words the executive would have unlimited
discretion. Not so in the case of the processing tax. The tax is to be
levied only when the Secretary finds that it will carry out the declared
policy of Congress. The Schechter and Ryan Cases are apparently the
only cases in which the Supreme Court has ever held Congressional
delegation of power to the executive unconstitutional. In neither case
was a definite declaration of policy such as the A. A. A. contains made.
A delegation of power quite similar to that in the Agricultural Act
public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people is
hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to re-
move obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend
to diminish the amount thereof; and to provide for the general welfare by pro-
moting the organization of industry for the purpose of co6perative action among
trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under
adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive
practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive
capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be
temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural
products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to
improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve
natural resources." 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §70f (1934 Supp.).
148 STAT. 196 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §703 (1934 Supp.).
'Supra note 86. " Supra note 8.
1293 U. S. 633, 55 Sup. Ct. 239, 79 L. ed. 223 (1935).
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was contained in a statute upheld in the Flexible Tariff Case.91 The
President was authorized to raise the duty, determine when, how much
and upon what goods it should be raised. In an earlier statute, which
the Supreme Court also held constitutional, 92 the power to tax goods on
which no duty was placed by the act was delegated.
The District Court in its opinion in the Hoosac Mills Case93 says,
after citing many decisions: "These cases demonstrate that when Con-
gress has gone as far as it reasonably can in declaring a policy and the
means to accomplish the end sought, leaving to administrative officers
the filling in of details, the statute will very likely be upheld even if no
definite standard has been established and though the functions are legis-
lative in character." The Circuit Court of Appeals in reversing94 the
District Court attempts to dispose of these cases by pointing out differ-
ences between them and the case under review which are not sufficient
to sustain a distinction. It would seem that Congress went as far as it
could in laying down standards in the statute.9 5 The end sought is such
as to require great flexibility in the legislation. If it be thought that
this is a borderline96 case the chance that the Act will be sustained is
still good because the Supreme Court has held delegation of power by
Congress invalid in only two cases 9T although statutes have frequently
been attacked on that ground. Furthermore there is a constantly grow-
ing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislatures
and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.9 8
If the original Act should be held unconstitutional and the tax there-
fore invalid, the Court must determine the effect of the amendment 99
1 J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348, 72
L. ed. 624 (1928). See also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct.
480, 55 L. ed. 563 (1911).
1 Field v. Clarke, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294 (1892).
' Franklin Process Co. v. Hoosac Mills Corporation, 8 F. Supp. 552 (D. Mass.
1934).
" Supra note 1. A state statute similar to the A. A. A. was held unconstitu-
tional in Chas. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 43 P. (2d) 983 (Wash. 1935). The
court does not analyze the statute in its opinion, contenting itself with glittering
generalities such as: "It is manifest that, under Secs. 2 and 7, the Legislature
attempted to delegate legislative power." "The Legislature is bound by the Con-
stitution ... and so are we...
Brewster, infra note 96.
TAxATION UNDER THE A. A. A., supra note 84, treats the delegation of power
as probably unconstitutional but Brewster, one of the authors of that book, had
previously said that there was not much likelihood of the law being held uncon-
stitutional because of the delegation of power. Brewster, Is the Process Tax Con-
stitutional (1933) 19 A; B. A. J. 419.
Schechter and Ryan Cases, supra notes 79 and 90.
"The law thereon may be said to be in a condition of flux on some phases,
and the last judicial word has not yet been spoken possibly." Merchants' Exchange
v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 631, 111 S. W. 565, 568 (1908).
'2.U. S. L. Week 1114, August 20, 1935. Id. 1125, August 27, 1935.
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approved late in August, 1935, which in terms ratifies and confirms the
taxes previously initiated by determination and proclamation of the Sec-
retary of Agriculture. The general rule is that where an act purports to
be done by authority of the state a defect in that authority may be cured
by the subsequent adoption of the act.100 Application of this rule to a
case like the present is doubtful if Congress could not originally have
given the authority to the Secretary to do the acts.10 However the
amendment may be valid as a retrospective tax act. Retrospective legis-
lation is valid'0 2 provided it does not'affect vested rights and the tax-
payer has no vested right in the tax rate.'0 3 Apparently a tax may be
levied on a privilege already exercised, so long as the tax is not un-
reasonable or arbitrary.' 0 4 Consequently the fourth objection of the
receivers to paying the levy may be overruled either because the delega-
tion of power to the Secretary of Agriculture was constitutional or be-
'Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U. S. 549, 33 Sup. Ct. 585, 57 L. ed. 960 (1913).
"Whilst it is admitted that Congress had the power to levy tariff duties on
goods coming into the United States from the Philippine Islands or coming into
such islands from the United States after the ratification of the treaty, it is yet
urged that, as that body was without authoriy to delegate to the President the
legislative power of prescribing a tariff of duties, it hence could not, by ratification,
make valid the exercise by the President of a legislative authority which could
not have been delegated to him in the first instance. But the premise upon which
this proposition rests presupposes that Congress, in dealing with the Philippine
Islands, may not, growing out of the relation of those islands to the United States,
delegate legislative authority to such agencies as it may select,--a proposition
which is not now open for discussion." United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S. 370,
385, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 746, 51 L. ed. 1098, 1103 (1907).
"If the legislature possessed the power to authorize the Act to be done it
could by a retrospective act cure the evils which existed because the power thus
conferred had been irregularly executed." Thompson v. Lee County, 70 U. S.
327, 331, 18 L. ed. 177, 178 (1866).
After the decision of Chas. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 43 P. (2d) 983 (Wash.
1935), cited note 94 supra, the Legislature of Washington passed an Act purporting
to adopt the orders made under the former act. The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that this act was also invalid as an attempt to ratify an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. State of Washington v. Matson Company, 2 U.
S. L. Week 1104, July 27, 1935.
' Curtis v. Whitney, 80 U. S. 68, 20 L. ed. 513 (1872). Ex post facto laws
within the meaning of the Constitution are retroactive criminal or 'penal laws only.
Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58 U. S. 456, 15 L. ed. 127 (1855).
' Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. ed. 809 (1931).
' Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 87 U. S. 323, 331, 22 L. ed. 348, 351
(1874) ; Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, 282, 34 Sup. Ct. 421, 424, 58 L. ed.
596, 606 (1914); Wagner v. Leser, 239 U. S. 207, 216, 36 Sup. Ct. 66, 68, 60 L. ed.
230, 236 (1915); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct.
236, 60 L. ed. 493 (1916) ; Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324,
75 L. ed. 809 (1931). In Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71
L. ed. 1184 (1927), as in Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353,
72 L. ed. 645 (1928), the basis of the decision was that the nature and amount of
the tax burden imposed could not have been understood and foreseen by the tax-
payer at the time of the particular voluntary act which was made the occasion of
the tax.
THE A. A. A. PROCESSING TAX
.cause Congress made the tax legal by subsequently adopting his
,determination.
V
Does the Act deprive the taxpayer of property without due process
of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment?105 In Magnano v. Ham-
ilton'06 it is said:
"Except in rare and special instances the due process of law clause
,contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing
power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. ... That clause is
applicable to a taxing statute such as the one here assailed only if the
act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that it does not involve
an exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes, in substance and effect,
the direct exertion of a different and forbidden power, as, for example,
the confiscation of property."
The Act under discussion does in form and substance involve an
exertion of the taxing power as shown above. It is not arbitrary but is
reasonably suited to the purpose in view.10 7 The purpose of Congress
was to raise money to be used in reestablishing prices to farmers at a
level that gives agricultural commodities a purchasing power equivalent
to their purchasing power in the base period.'0 8 If this change in price
were brought about by the operation of the law of supply and demand
without the intervention of 'government the increase in price would have
to be paid by the processor and might be passed on to the consumer.
Congress has provided for the additional cost to be borne in the same
way under the A. A. A. "In increasing these prices [of necessities] to
consumers this plan does not place an unfair tax upon them but merely
restores to farmers part of that which they have lost through the price
inequalities brought about during the depression."' 0 9
Since the decision and opinion in Nebbia v. New York,110 it seems
'The discussion in the present article is limited to the constitutionality of
those fundamental provisions of the Act which form the backbone of the 'plan
and are so essential that the policy of Congress can not be carried out unless they
are sustained. The Act contained a separability clause (§14, 17 U. S. C. A. §614)
which will preserve the validity of the Act although nonessential details may be
held invalid. Because of limits in time and space these nonessential features, such
as licensing provisions, compensating and floor stock taxes, and sugar quota reg-
ulations, will not be treated.
108292 U. S. 40, 44, 54 Sup. Ct. 599, 601, 78 L. ed. 1109, 1114 (1934). If it be
considered as a regulatory law it is no less reasonable. Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685 (1917) ; Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934). The Magnanw Case
established that the requirement of due process is the same in the 5th and 14th
Amendments.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. at 525, 54 Sup. Ct. at 510, 78 L. ed. at 950.
Supra note 8.
Jennings and Sullivan, supra note 3, at 910, n. 79.
uo 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934). Cf. Tagg Bros. &
Moorehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50 Sup. Ct 220, 74 L. ed. 524 (1930) ;
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to be settled that the requirement of due process does not prevent gov-
ernment price fixing by the states in business which the public interest
requires shall be regulated. In this connection attention must again be
(called to the fact that the price fixing under the A. A. A. is accom-
plished not by governmental sanction but by pecuniary inducement to
crop reduction.' 1 ' For these reasons-the reasonableness of the tax
scheme, the public interest in the purchasing power of agricultural com-
modities, and the voluntary and contractural nature of the price fixing-
the Fifth Amendment apparently is not violated.
VI
The two remaining objections to the tax can not both be sustained
to any one tax because one assumes that the tax is direct and the other
that it is indirect, but one may apply to the processing tax and the other
to the floor stock tax.
The second question raised in the government's petition for certiorari
is whether the taxes are invalid in that they are not uniform and there-
fore violate the provision of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Con-
stitution. 11.2 It is now well settled that this provision of the Constitu-
tion only requires geographical uniformity."18 Classes may be created
and conditions imposed so long as the conditions and basis of classifica-
tion apply to all parts of the United States alike. 1 4 The argument of
the taxpayer is based upon the provision of Section 11 of the Act which
authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to exclude from the operation
of the Act any basic commodity or any regional classification thereof.
It is true that the exercise of this authority by the Secretary might
result in the same commodity being taxed if it came from one part of
the country and exempt if produced in another. This could occur how-
ever only if the Secretary found that conditions were different in the
two sections. The rule is therefore uniform. The fact that the appli-
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130, 75
L. ed. 324 (1931). But see Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. ed. 1103 (1923) ; Tyson & Brother
v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718 (1927) ; Ribnich v. Mc-
Bride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. ed. 913 (1928) ; New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. ed. 747 (1932).
2l Supra notes 43, 41.
Quoted in third paragraph of this article.
The Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247, 28 L. ed. 798 (1884);
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 48, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 773, 44 L. ed. 969, 973
(1900) ; Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 22 Sup. Ct. 493, 46 L. ed. 713 (1902).
'" Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236, 60 L. ed. 493.
(1916) ; Bronbley v. McCaugn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46, 75 L. ed. 226 (1929).
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cation of the rule to the different sections would bring different results
does not make the rule unconstitutional.'1 5
VII
Are the taxes imposed by the Agricultural Adjustment Act direct
taxes and invalid because not apportioned under the provision of Article
1, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution? A strong argument can be
advanced for the proposition that the floor stock taxes are direct
taxes.116 The discussion here will be limited to the processing taxes
because, although the floor taxes are important, they are not essential to
the execution of the purpose of Congress and if found to be invalid
may be eliminated in accordance with the separability clause of the Act,
leaving the rest of the statute constitutional. 117 The question remains
whether the processing tax is a direct tax or an excise tax.
The Supreme Court is at present committed to the doctrine that
direct taxes in the constitutional sense embrace all levies on real or per-
sonal property because of its ownership."18 On the other hand those
taxes which are imposed upon the exercise of a privilege connected with
ownership are not direct."19 The processing tax seems to fall clearly
within the second class. The charge is based upon the processing, that
is upon the privilege or act of processing.' 20 The tax therefore is not
subject to the provisions of Article 1, Section 9, Clause 4. The con-
clusion that the tax is not direct makes it of course subject to the re-
quirement of uniformity but as shown above that requirement has been
complied with.
In conclusion, the constitutionality' 2 ' of the processing tax depends
first upon the proper construction of the General Welfare Clause of the
Constitution. An interpretation which limits the taxing and spending
power to purposes connected with the other enumerated powers will be
m Franklin Process Co. v. Hoosac Mills, 8 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D. Mass. 1934).
The brief filed for the United States in the Supreme Court states (on page 45)
that the only crop to which these provisions of section 11 have been found applicable
is tobacco.
nO TAXATION UNDER THE A. A. A., supra note 84.
'
7 Supra note 105.
11 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. ed. 969 (1900);
Bromley v. McCaugn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46, 75 L. ed. 226 (1929).
I" Cases supra notes 114, 115.
2248 STAT. 528, 7 U. S. C. A. §609(a) (1934 Supp.).
"I If the Supreme Court should decide in the Hoosac Mills Case that the
A. A. A. is unconstitutional the decision would probably not settle the hundreds
of suits for injunction which have been filed by tax payers all over the country
because the Hoosac Case is a receivership proceeding and does not involve the
question of the availability to a taxpayer of the remedy by injunction. The
Supreme Court has itself granted temporary injunctions in eight cases brought by
rice processors. 3 U. S. L. Week 209, Nov. 26, 1935.
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contrary to the practical construction given by the legislative and exec-
utive branches of the government since the adoption of the Constitution.
Second, it depends upon whether the purpose of the A. A. A. ap-
propriations is public or not. The cases make the answer to this question
obscure. On principle the purpose is clearly public.
Third, it depends upon the validity or invalidity of the delegation of
power to the Secretary of Agriculture. This seems to be the greatest
danger point in the government's case. The delegation does not neces-
sarily make the Act unconstitutional, however, because the declared
p6licy of Congress is much more definite than it was in the N. I. R. A.
If factors other than technical rules of law are to enter into the
decision, some of them at least seem to favor the sustaining of the Act.
It is time that Mr. Justice Brandeis, if he believes in social experimenta-
tion,122 give some encouragement to the New Deal since the two deci-
sions against the N. I. R. A. certainly have had the opposite effect.
Furthermore, in view of the long established high tariff policy which
discriminates against the farmer and in favor of the manufacturer
(processor) social justice seems to require some such adjustment as is
attempted by the statute in question. 123
2Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution (1931) 45 HARv. L.
REv. 33, 44; Mason, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitition (1932) 80 U. o.
PA. L. REv. 799, 823; Hamilton, The Jurist's Art (1931) 31 Coi. L. REv. 1073;
Richberg, The Industrial Liberalism of Justice Brandeis (1931) Id. 1094.
m WALLAcE, op. cit. supra note 31, 137 and c. c. 7, 11.
